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Showing posts with label competition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label competition. Show all posts

Monday, May 19, 2014

Does SM create higher prices?

In a recent posting on Better Farming, another person repeats the often made claims that Supply Management ("SM") doesn't create higher prices for the commodities that they control.  He provides the case of Australia and New Zealand as proof positive.

I assume he is referring to the removal of SM from their dairy industry in New Zealand.

For those interested, the Globe & Mail provides a good, short history on SM in New Zealand, why New Zealand developed the way it did, and then chose to abandoned SM, starting around the 1980.

I agree that doing away with, or modifying SM in Canada will not necessarily lower the price of previously SM commodities in Canada.  The world is complex, many factors interact to create the outcome.  Not all economists agree why there are "sticky prices" (also called nominal rigidity, market inertia, or market friction).

In 1998, Alan Blinder and others surveyed 100 corporations on how and why they made changes to their prices, so as to compare real-world actions against the 12 prominent theories economists have used to describe price stickiness.  Blinder wrote the book on price stickiness, called "Asking About Prices:   A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness", 400 pages, ISBN 978-0-87154-121-5, $34.95,

Alan Blinder is Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics at Princeton University, where he has taught since 1971. He also founded and directs Princeton’s Center for Economic Policy Studies. He has served as vice chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System and as a member of the US President’s Council of Economic Advisers.  To me, it sounds like he might know what he is talking about.

Why don't companies change prices more frequently than they do?  The #1 reason provided was:

"It would antagonize or cause difficulties for our customers" which was 20.9% of all responses received (41 responses out of 196 total responses, from 151 firms.

Here is the survey answers received (click on graphs & tables for larger version):

Why don't you change your prices more often?, survey results from Blinder et al, for
151 US firms in various industries, 1998.
The top 6 reasons provided represent 81% of all answers received (ie. Pareto's "Vital Few").

Reasons for not changing prices more frequently.  Source:   Blinder et al.

Organizations tend to care about how customer's feel when they realize that angry or disrespected customers tend to get even by voting with their feet and/or wallets, leaving you for your competitors.  With a monopoly, that can't easily happen, so monopolists tend to be less concerned about what customers think or do.  This would mean that the top two reasons don't apply to monopolists, so they are ready to change prices much more easily, in both frequency and magnitude.

Blinder also provides data on the 4 major driving forces on those who change prices, and how long before a price change occurs after that exogenous event (ie. outside forces cause a change, then firm decides to change their prices in response):
How long after an exogenous trigger event does the firm change their prices?
Time lag in months.  As expected, it can be as fast as the same day for a firm
suffering cost increases (Mean - 3 Std. Deviations or zero, whichever is greater),
to as long as 15 months for a firm experiencing a decrease in their costs before
they pass those savings on to their customers (Mean + 3 Std. Deviations).
Source: Table 4.3, Blinder et al.

The firms were asked why they tend to avoid raising prices before their competitors do.  An overwhelming majority said,

"If we raised our prices first, we would lose too much business to low price competitors."

Obviously, not a concern when you're running a monopoly with 99.96% market share.  Guess why Canada's SM Mafia love raising prices on a consistent basis, like clock work?

Canada's Chicken Mafia are obviously not troubled by "Sticky Prices",
they make absolutely sure to raise prices almost continuously, rain or shine,
for the last 17 years and counting, 3.54%/yr price increase on average.
Graph from SFPFC's Blog posting on Feb. 28, 2013
Chicken Price Parity Will It Ever Come?


Flexible pricing is the opposite of sticky prices.  The most flexible pricing occurs when every trading opportunity is priced on a 1-off basis, without regard to any previous trades made.


Sticky prices serve a useful purpose in the marketplace.  In one simple model used to investigate sticky prices,

As I understand it, to get price reductions, there has to be:
  1. a free market,
  2. effective price discovery,
  3. no or minimal collusion by the major players
  4. a competitive marketplace, and
  5. adequate slope on the price-volume supply curve
  6. low or insignificant barriers or thresholds to the entry of new players
  7. natural consequences (ie. bankruptcy, consumer shunning, etc.) for poor suppliers.
Without all of these and more factors, prices tend not to change for the better.
One of the biggest drivers of price changes are competitors.  If a competitor raises or lowers prices, other suppliers tend to follow the lead, or at least, it prompts them to reconsider their current strategy, and decide if they want to join, stand pat, or go in the opposite direction.  Witness the wave of retail gas price changes that often occur once one gas station bites the bullet, and changes their price.

The second biggest factor is the slope of a supplier's price-volume curve.  This means that there must be a significant difference to the total profits of the supplier if they are to go to the work and hassle of optimizing their price vs. volume factors (usually means low overhead cost suppliers are more motivated to change first in a competitive market).

There also must be low thresholds for new people to enter the marketplace.  Without this, the veterans often get sloppy and complacent over time, become less and less efficient over time, and don't take care of their customer's best interests.

When suppliers are saved from the natural consequences of poor service (ie. government grants, favors to "friends", regulatory entrapment and changing the rules in favor of status quo, etc.), the pain in the marketplace is allowed to continue a little longer, and to a greater degree.

Economists have found that price changes can occur second by second (ie. Chicago Board of Trade commodities), to as long as a 4 year cycle, but the median is around 1 year between price changes.  For more info, see Sticky Price Manifesto and Nominal Rigidity

To reach equilibrium, it usually takes between 3 to 7 time constants to get over 90% of the resulting price adjustment effect to have occurred.

We must therefore hold off in jumping to conclusions about price effects until 3 to 7 years have passed.

For example, someone who understands how the world works won't check the status every day on an acorn that they planted by digging it up to check for root development, then giving up in just seven days because nothing seems to have occurred as assumed.

It takes longer, you must have patience.

When SM is removed, either by government changing the laws, or by consumers bypassing the laws and SM's monopoly, we need to ensure that the new system meets the 7 requirements listed above, and we will soon enjoy the more affordable commodities Canadians deserve, and will enjoy more and more.

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Why are there Gorillas in Ontario Chicken Coops?

There are 142 gorillas living in Ontario chicken coops.  How so, you say, my faithful Blog Dogs?  Read on, and learn.

Throughout CFO's literature, they feature the young farm family, kids in tow, as the poster family for chicken farmers, just like the advertising executives recommended.  It's easy to trust (and hard to worry about) somebody who looks like the perfect Canadian family.

Is CFO telling the whole story?



Chart 7 is from CFO's 2011 Annual Report.  It is a very carefully designed chart, intended to be truthful, yet avoids exposing the problem.

Notice the simple and innocent "over 50,000 units".  The number of farmers who are in that category (142) doesn't seem to be out of line with the other categories, and this represents just 14% of the total number of farmers; again not out of line with the other categories.

What we need to ask is "Why did CFO stop at 50,000 as the biggest category?".  In other words, we know its bigger than 50,000 but just how big is it?  CFO isn't saying.  I wondered why, and you can probably guess what comes next after I start wondering about something.

CFO does say that a handful of farmers have under 14,000 units, those who are grandfathered in before the minimum quota was set at 14,000 quota units.  By knowing that the total basic quota for Ontario is 35,798,018 units, and using the geometric mean value for the average quota for each of the 6 categories, we can estimate the top end of the "over 50,000 units".

Based on those assumptions, we estimate the top end of the 6th range to be 196,500 units.  So the top category seems to be from 50,000 units to 196,500 quota units.  This gives a geometric median size of 99,122 units.  Now why couldn't CFO just come out and say that?  Why did they have to hide that fact?

Oh oh, I'm starting to wonder again.  Here comes more digging, so get your shovels and come see what ooze we dig up this time.

And there's the rub.  Note that all the other categories have a range (ie. max. - min.) of 10,000 units, but the top category has a 146,500 range.  I wonder why CFO made this choice for the categories?

Might I suggest that CFO isn't comfortable with just how big the biggest guys really are.  They needed to hide this info, so they carefully chose the category range so as to hide this issue.

So why is CFO worried about this?

Perhaps CFO has heard about HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index).  It is typically used to measure market share.  For example, most governments use it to calculate market dominance and competitiveness in the marketplace.  When a big gorilla in the marketplace proposes to buy out a small competitor, the government does the HHI calculation on the basis of both before and after the proposed merger.  If the HHI change is too large, permission is refused, and the acquisition must be abandoned.  Secondly, when a monopoly exists, and the HHI is huge, the government uses it as justification for anti-trust breakup of the market gorilla into smaller units (eg. Standard Oil, AT&T, etc.).

So what is the HHI for Ontario chicken farmers?



In the above table, HHI is calculated with whole percentages for market share, so HHI ranges from 0 to 10,000 units.  We can see that the HHI for the 6 categories of chicken farmers all have small portions of the HHI, except the last category.  The last category, the one that was hidden by CFO, represents 69.24% of the HHI score.

We have found the gorilla in the chicken coop.  These 142 mega of the mega producers have 39.3% of the total quota for Ontario.  That's why CFO carefully hid this data from prying eyes.  Notice that this category only has 142 "farmers".  I would guess that there are some multi-national corporations in or near this group of 142 quota holders.  These are the people who really control CFO.  I suggest that the other 871 chicken farmers in Ontario are probably just along for the ride, and have little influence with CFO.

Do any of the small quota holders feel listened to when they call CFO?  Do these 871 small farmers know what is going on at the CFO Board meetings?  Are all the little secrets of CFO shared with these 871 peewee chicken farmers, or it it too confidential for these small guys to be informed?

I bet the 142 gorillas know all the facts, both inside and outside of CFO.

I bet that when a gorilla picks up the phone and calls CFO, everybody at CFO jumps to attention for the V.I.P. gorilla on the phone, they start saluting, and saying "Yes sir, right away sir, thank-you sir".

Who would have known that there are 142 gorillas hidden in Ontario's chicken coops?  I wonder if we should alert the SPCA, or possibly the Toronto Zoo?